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SUITABILITY AND NONMALEFICENCE: A PROPOSAL FOR
INSURANCE PRODUCER REGULATORY
REFORM
Mark Franke*

I. INTRODUCTION
There are worse things in life than death. Have you ever spent an evening with an
insurance salesman? –Woody Allen 1

L

et’s face it: spending time with an insurance agent is
probably not on the top of the list of things you love to do.
But when you buy a new car, add an addition to your house, or
get a new job that boosts your earning capacity, calling your
agent is surely near the top of the list of the things you have to do.
We call our agents—in statutory parlance, “producers” 2 —tell
them about the change of our circumstances and, as painlessly
and quickly as possible, aim to get the coverage we need. While
we vary in our solicitude, to some extent those of us who use an
agent to obtain coverage for our risks inevitably rely on our
agents to understand these risks and obtain for us coverage at a
reasonable cost; we ask our agents to take care of us, trusting that
they will exercise basic diligence in their service to us and will
“tell the truth and . . . keep their promises.” 3
But should we as a matter of course? Perhaps. After all, as
The University of Michigan Law School, J.D. 2013.
Jamie Frater, Top 25 Woody Allen Quotes, LISTVERSE,
http://www.listverse.com/2007/12/09/top-15-woody-allen-quotes/ (last visited
May 2, 2013).
2
See, e.g., PRODUCER LICENSING MODEL ACT OF 2005.
3
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law in the Twenty-First Century, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 1289, 1291 (2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
*
1
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a general principle, “[t]rust saves time and money. . . allow[ing]
[us] to use the talents of strangers” on matters about which we
lack expertise. 4 Attendant to such trust, however, lies the menace
of its abuse and the cost of protecting ourselves from the harm
that would result from exploitation.5 So perhaps not. While the
law generally should conform to our reasonable expectations, 6
such reliance must be objectively reasonable for a court to give
recompense for any resulting harm. 7 Even if judges are loath to
impose any duties commensurate to such reliance, agents are not
so reluctant to invite duty, to varying degrees, from unwary
consumers. 8 This paper proposes a new statutory framework of
duties for the regulation of insurance producers to address the
trust consumers’ place in producers. It aims to impose duties on
producers that are tailored to allow for a reasonable level of
reliance by consumers on professionals of this type.
Heightened duties may arise by contract or statute. 9 They
may also be implied in a relationship, such as the duty of care in
tort law 10 or in special relationships wherein one party reposes
trust and confidence in another to act in his best interest and the
other accepts such trust. 11 There are, generally, two moving parts
which may be tinkered with to arrive at the appropriate cocktail
of duties: duty of care and duty of loyalty. The duty of care is
essentially a duty to exercise proper diligence required by the task
TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS
CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 49 (2006).
5
Frankel, supra note 3, at 1291.
6
See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176
(Iowa 1975) (citing Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 90508 (Iowa 1973).
7
See id.
8
See, e.g., TWG INSURANCE, http://www.twginsurance.com (last visited
May 5, 2013) (suggesting that it will obtain “the best coverage at the lowest
cost”); STILLWELL INSURANCE, http://www.stillwellinsurance.com/home.html
(last visited May 5, 2013) (suggesting that the broker will find insurance
companies “best suited to your individual needs” and admonishing that “it is to
your advantage to have a trained professional to look out for your interests”).
9
See Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing and Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV.
899, 902 (2011).
10
Where there is a foreseeable victim of a foreseeable harm which could
result from the actions of an actor, the actor is generally held to have a duty to
take reasonable steps to prevent such harm. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ.
of California, 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (citing cases).
11
See, e.g., Broomfield v. Kosow et. al, 212 N.E.2d 556, 560 (Mass. 1965)
(holding that the depositing of trust must be accompanied by the acceptance of
such trust for a fiduciary relationship to arise).
4
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at hand. 12 The duty of loyalty is the duty of an agent not to enrich
himself at the expense of his agent; it is the renunciation of self,
“however hard the abnegation.” 13 When we entrust ourselves or
our property to another we accordingly may do so in two ways:
(1) by trusting the other will exercise sufficient thoughtfulness
(care) or (2) by trusting the other to renounce their self-interest in
favor of ours (loyalty). These moving parts, however, have been
sliced up and re-grafted into a so-called “suitability standard” in
the context of broker-dealers of financial securities. The
suitability standard is less onerous than full fiduciary duties but
treats broker-dealers as more than mere salespersons. A similar
standard, together with other specific rules, has now been set
forth in the Dodd-Frank Act for the regulation of mortgage
brokers. Following the trend set by this adaptation of the
suitability standard in the Dodd-Frank Act, in this paper I shall
propose a modified version of the suitability standard for
insurance producers and a rule not to harm when choosing
among suitable contracts, what I will term a “non-maleficence”
rule. Together, these will create an appropriate cocktail of care
and loyalty tailored specifically to the insurance producer
context. 14
This paper begins with two premises. First, that
consumers always rely upon producers to take care of their needs.
Second, that producers should not enrich themselves at the
expense of the customer. There are, correspondingly, two
problems this paper aims to address. The first—that there is no
duty for insurance producers to sell insurance contracts suitable
to the customer—arises out of the deficiency of the common law
of agency and the failure of licensing strategies to separate all the
chaff from the grain. The second—that there is nothing that
prevents producers from steering consumers to contracts which
lead to better compensation outcomes for the producer while
12
See In re Caremark Int’l Inv. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del.
Ch. 1996).
13
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928).
14
The application of a suitability standard to life insurance producers has
been suggested before. See generally Richard J. Wirth, My Customer’s Keeper:
The Search for A Universal Suitability Standard in the Sale of Life Insurance,
24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 47 (2002). Professor Wirth’s study, however, focused
on the appropriate calculations for defining the scope of a customer’s need for
life insurance in connection with a possible suitability analysis and the
correspondingly appropriate life insurance products. See id. at 63-69. The
current study focuses on applying a suitability requirement and nonmaleficence rule to all insurance producers.
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costing the consumer more—arises out of compensation
arrangements that may lead to a producer steering a consumer to
an insurer or a policy that puts more dollars in the producer’s
pocket.
The law regulating the placement of consumer insurance
contracts by insurance producers is fractured. As a matter of the
common law, it is a complicated question of fact to whom
producers owe their allegiance as agents. 15 Moreover, there is
usually no duty to advise the customer on the appropriateness of
a given insurance contract for the particular customer. The law
generally treats producers as the mere salesmen that were the
subject of Mr. Allen’s lament. 16 But, due to the high verification
costs and lack of expertise with respect to consumers of insurance
contracts, the law does not reflect the reasonable expectation that
producers will take care of the consumer purchasers. 17 While
increasing requirements may increase transaction costs, this may
be offset by increased trust in markets that accompanies the
better advice and the reduction of information asymmetries. 18
In the area of compensation arrangements that cause
producer-customer conflicts of interest, some states address the
problem through a broker fee disclosure requirement. Others
require, upon request, commission and quote comparison
disclosures. 19 Even if these disclosures provide the information
needed for the market to solve these conflicts of interest, the
efficacy of disclosures to consumers is questionable. Moreover,
the market for consumer insurance contracts is not such that
information is widely incorporated into the price that consumers
are willing to pay. Lastly, all states license producers, but
licensing fails to ensure that each transaction is consummated

For a discussion of agency, see infra Section III.A.1.
For a discussion of producer duties under the common law, see infra
Section III.A.2.
17
See FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 52 (noting the relationship between
monitoring costs and heightened duties); see also Daniel Schwarcz,
Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1325
(2011) (noting the low likelihood that consumer insurance purchasers would
understand the contracts, even if they had access to them).
18
See Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage
Crisis and the Social Capital Response 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 314 (2008)
(“[The l]aw can [provide] trust . . . by the creation of fiduciary duties that may
help to offset information asymmetries.”).
19
For a discussion of fee and compensation disclosures, see infra Section
III.C.B.
15
16
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with the consumer’s interest in mind. 20
This paper will use the examples of the suitability
requirements imposed upon brokers of financial securities by
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the selfregulating organization (SRO) of the financial industry, the
record-keeping requirements imposed on securities brokers by the
U.S. securities laws, the anti-steering provisions of the DoddFrank Act applicable to residential mortgage brokers, and the
rules promulgated pursuant to Dodd-Frank and the securities
laws by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), all of which
provide useful models for the regulation of insurance producers.
Before arriving at its end, this paper will begin with a brief
introduction to the categories of insurance producers. It will
follow with an exposition of the two problems this paper’s
proposal aims to ameliorate and, in so doing, exposit and critique
the current regulation of insurance producers through the
common law, licensure, and compensation disclosure regimes.

II. INTRODUCTION TO INSURANCE MARKET
PRODUCERS
As a preliminary matter, it is important to make clear that
the contracts which insurance producers broker are adhesion
contracts, 21 as this is essential to the nature of a producer’s role in
the transaction. While contrary to the classical contract law
notion that a contract should be a “meeting of the minds,”
adhesion contracts have come to be accepted because they
facilitate a more efficient economy. These contracts reduce
transaction costs, notwithstanding the risk that the terms may
unfairly protect the party who offers them. 22 To protect against
such risk, state legislatures may expressly dictate acceptable
terms for the insurance contracts or delegate the authority to
approve the terms of contracts to state regulators. 23 In light of the
regulatory oversight of the contract terms and the fact that, in
20
For a discussion of licensing regimes for insurance producers, see infra
Section III.C.A.
21
See 1-1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4 (1993) (internal citation omitted).
22
Id.
23
Id.; see, e.g., Texas Ins. Code, Tit. 10, Subtit. 1, Ch. 2301, Subch. A, §
2301.006 (requiring that the insurance commissioner approve of any form used
for writing property and causality insurance prior to use by an insurance
company).
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most cases, consumer insurance contracts cover relatively small
risks, direct negotiation is not necessary. 24 It follows that it is
equally unnecessary to have an agent of the insurer with
authority to negotiate terms of the contract to broker the
transaction. As such, most consumer contracts are consummated
through a third party producer without such authority. 25
An insurance producer is “an individual or . . . firm, with
some degree of independence from the insurer, which stands
between the buyer and the seller of insurance.” 26 There are a few
types of insurance producers: exclusive agents, managing general
agents, brokers, and independent agents. Exclusive agents act as
an authorized and exclusive representative of one, or primarily
one, insurer.27 Managing the general agents are a specialized type
of broker who can underwrite on behalf of insurers and place
contracts with insurers. 28
Brokers are generally understood to be firms who serve as
market makers with a multi-regional scope and providing a wide
range of sophisticated services such as modeling risk, managing
captive insurers, loss control services, and risk modeling and
management. 29 Brokers are generally considered to be agents of
the insured, notwithstanding that they often consummate “agency
appointment” contracts undertaken with the insurers.30
Independent agents are sometimes characterized as non-exclusive
agents of the insurer, 31 and sometimes as independent of the
insurer.32 The line between brokers and independent agents blurs
as a practical matter, for they often perform nearly identical
services to the purchasers of policies, 33 but independent agents
tend to be smaller, regional service providers to primarily small
LEE R. RUSS, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d. § 1:2 (2012).
Id.
26
J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of Insurance
Intermediaries, 73 J. RISK & INS. 359, 360 (2006).
27
Id. at 360-61.
28
See
Managing
General
Agent
(MGA),
IRMI,
http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/m/managing-generalagent-mga.aspx (last visited May 5, 2013).
29
Cummins & Doherty, supra note 26, at 361.
30
Id.
31
See, e.g., id.
32
See Agent/Broker Compensation Disclosure, ZURICH IN NORTH
AMERICA,
http://www.zurichnaproducercompensation.com/Welcome.aspx
(last visited May 5, 2013) (noting that Zurich “value[s], and customers rely on,
agents’ and brokers’ trusted professional advice” and that “brokers and
independent agents are not employed by Zurich”).
33
Cummins & Doherty, supra note 26, at 361.
24
25
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businesses and consumers. 34 Cummins and Doherty suggest that
the true distinction between brokers and independent agents is
the volume and breadth of services offered. 35 The use of terms in
the industry for the various intermediaries is, in a word,
muddled. 36
Baker and Logue note that a purist might insist that the
term agent should only be used to describe someone who acts as
an agent of the insurer. 37 The taxonomy of producers, however, is
immaterial to this study, as its proposal is to apply a blanket
suitability standard and non-maleficence rule upon all producers
who broker consumer insurance contract transactions. 38

III. THE PROBLEMS
A. Problem 1: Producers Have No Duty to Advise
Notwithstanding that insurance producers are often the
only person the end consumer interacts with at the time of
contract formation; producers in general have no duty to guide
the consumer to a contract that is suitable to their needs. This
section will describe more fully the first problem this paper aims
to address through the imposition of a modified suitability
requirement. It will lay out the common law principles of agency
Id.
Cummins & Doherty, supra note 26, at 361.
36
See, e.g., Leslie Jackson Conwell, The Role of Health Insurance
Brokers: Providing Small Employers with a Helping Hand, CENTER FOR
STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE Issue Brief No. 57, 2 (Oct.
2002),http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/480/480.pdf
(“Brokers
are
typically independent agents . . . .”) (emphasis in original).
37
TOM BAKER & KYLE LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW [Manuscript Ch. 2, page
41] (3d ed. 2013) (on file with author). It appears that California is one state
which actually adheres to this framework, calling only those producers not
appointed and without actual authority to bind the insurer a “broker” and
those producers who are appointed, who have a delineated scope of actual
authority in their agency contract. Stephen L. Young, When May BrokerAgents
Charge
Fees?,
at
1-2,
http://www.ibawest.com/pdf/Articles/WhenMayBrokerAgentsChargeFees.pdf.
In addition, insurers are required to file notice with the California Department
of Insurance when any such appointment is made. Id.
38
The proposed duty framework contained herein should be applied to
both individual producers acting on their own behalf and upon larger
producers, those fitting Cummins and Doherty’s definition of “broker,” see
supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text, by the acts of its employees
according to respondeat superior principles.
34
35
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applicable to insurance producers and the limited duties they owe
the consumers they serve.
1. Agency
Insurance brokers sit in a curious position: as they
providing a service to the consumer, while being paid by
insurance companies. 39 Who is their master? Where do their
loyalties lie? Is an insurance broker only a market maker? Is an
insurance broker an advisor to the policy purchaser? Or both? Is
the insurance broker an agent of the insurer? Are there reasons to
believe that a particular insurance broker has a special
relationship to the policy purchaser such that the latter reposes
trust and confidence in the former? These questions permeate the
common law duties owed by an insurance broker to the consumer
purchaser. The answers to these questions determine the scope of
a broker’s duties to a purchaser.
Depending on the facts and circumstances of a given
transaction, courts come out differently on the question of who is
a producer’s principal. 40 Obviously, this is a fact-intensive
inquiry, requiring judicious analysis by the fact finder, 41 which
this paper proposes replacing with a new standard and rule
imposed upon all producers who transact with consumers.
The extent of a producer’s duties to consumer purchasers
of insurance is limited in part because producers are generally
considered special agents. 42 In the classical sense, an agent is a
fiduciary of its principal and is subject to his or her principal’s
control. 43 An agent must “act loyally for the principal’s benefit in
all matters connected . . . [to] the agency relationship.” 44 There are
two types of agents: general and special. A general agent is one
with authority to act on behalf of his principal in a series of
transactions involving ongoing service. 45 A special agent is one
See 1-2 Responsibilities of Insurance Agents and Brokers § 2.10.
Daniel Gregory Sakall, Can the Public Really Count on Insurance
Agents to Advise Them? A Critique of the “Special Circumstances” Test, 42
ARIZ. L. REV. 991, 991-93 (2000).
41
See Schimmel Fur Co. v. American Indem,. Co., 440 S.W.2d 932, 938
(Mo. 1969) (holding that the question of whether a broker is an agent of the
insured, the insurer, or both is a question of fact).
42
RUSS, supra note 24, at § 46:1, at 46-7.
43
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
44
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).
45
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 3 (1958). Note that the third
restatement abandoned the definitions of general and special agents.
39
40
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who is “authorized to conduct a single transaction or a series of
transactions not involving continuity of service.” 46 As a special
agent, therefore, producers have no ongoing duties to any policy
purchaser for whom they broker a contract. 47
Moreover, an insurance producer often acts as a dual
agent, that is, as an agent of the insured in some respects and an
agent for the insurer in others. 48 For instance a broker may act as
an agent for the insurer by collecting premiums and delivering
them to the insurer and as an agent for the insured in the
brokering of an insurance contract. 49 The key to the dual agency
concept is that the dual roles must not create a conflict of
interest. 50
Most case law and scholarship on agency principles
applicable to producers focuses on the extent to which acts or
statements of producers can be imputed to insurers. Enough cases
have been decided 51 and enough has been written 52 on the
circumstances under which acts of an insurance producer may be
imputed to the insurer. This paper is not concerned with the
circumstances under which acts or statements of a producer may
be imputed to the insurer or admitted as parol evidence. It is
concerned with imposing duties upon all producers who face the
consumers in the insurance marketplace to encourage trust and
efficiency in the consumer insurance markets.
2. Broker Duties at Common Law
What is the scope of a producer’s duty to his customer? In
general, it is very limited in scope and, consistent with the notion
that they are special agents, circulates around the transaction
brokered. Because the contracts offered to consumers are
adhesive, the primary activity of the producer is the delivery of
the contract. As such, there are three sets of facts under which a
policy purchaser may have a viable cause of action: (1) where the
broker fails to deliver the insurance promised; (2) where the
broker fails to obtain certain specific coverage requested; or (3)
Id.
RUSS, supra note 24, at § 46:38, at 46-84.
48
Id.
49
1-2 New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide § 2.07[4][d] (2012).
50
Id. at § 2.07[4][c][ii] (2012).
51
See, e.g., Economy Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bassett, 525 N.E.2d 539 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1988).
52
See, e.g., 1-2 Responsibilities of Insurance Agents and Brokers § 2.05
(2013).
46
47
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where the broker fails to obtain the amount of coverage
requested. 53
Brokers do not have any duty to determine the
appropriate amount of insurance for a particular purchaser of a
policy. 54 Likewise, they generally do not have a duty to advise on
the coverage that a purchaser should obtain.55 Similarly, there is
no duty to explain the coverage. 56 In general, there is no
reasonableness lens applied to the facts surrounding a
transaction. That is, any argument that the broker should have
known coverage was needed in a particular situation will likely
fail. 57 In essence, the only duty owed to the purchaser is to obtain
and deliver the policy requested by the purchaser. 58 That is, with
the rare exception, insurance producers are generally treated as
mere salespersons. 59 They merely present a quote, fill out the
forms, accept the payment, and deliver the policy promised.
While this duty might catch outright fraud, abusive, or dishonest
behavior in connection with the delivery of the policies
requested, 60 the common law courts are reluctant to impose any
kind of duty upon brokers, notwithstanding the inevitable
reliance upon them by consumers.
Under certain circumstances, a special relationship might
arise between a broker and the insured such that a duty to advise
Saunders v. Cariss, 274 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188-89 (Ct. App. 1990).
RUSS, supra note 24, at § 46:38, at 46-88.
55
See, e.g., Nelson v. Davidson, 456 N.W.2d 343 (Wis. 1990) (finding no
duty to advise client to get additional coverage for underinsured motorist
coverage); Wang v. Allstate Ins. Co., 592 A.2d 527, 532 (N.J. 1991) (finding no
duty to advise on the scope of coverage for a homeowner’s policy).
56
Durham v. Mobile Oil Corp., 12 F.3d 55, 57-58 (5th Cir. 1994)
(applying Louisiana law); Avila v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 147 F. Supp.
570, 581 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (applying Texas Law).
57
See, e.g., May v. United Services Ass’n of America, Inc., 844 S.W.2d
666 (Tex. 1992) (rejecting that a broker should have known from the facts
surrounding the transaction that certain coverage was needed).
58
Kaufmann v. Leatherstocking Coop. Ins. Co., 861 N.Y.S.2d 423, 425-26
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (holding that, absent some special relationship, no
liability may attach to a broker beyond any that may arise out of obtaining the
policy on the purchaser’s behalf).
59
Trammell v. Prairie States Ins. Co., 473 N.W.2d 460, 462 (S.D. 1991).
60
For example, in addition to the administrative penalties in a Lancaster
County, PA case against a local broker, it is likely that these duties would
capture the same activity. See, e.g., Tim Mekeel, Lancaster County insurance
broker accused of overcharging customers, LANCASTER ONLINE (Mar. 19,
2013, 4:10 PM), http://lancasteronline.com/article/local/827977_LancasterCounty-insurance-broker-accused-of-overcharging-customers.html.
53
54
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the insured exists. For instance, in Michigan, a duty to advise
may arise where the broker misrepresents the scope of coverage. 61
This essentially equates to a duty to correct the
misrepresentation. Similarly, if the broker gives inaccurate advice
to a purchaser, the same duty to correct is triggered. 62 Lastly, if
the purchaser makes an ambiguous request for coverage, the
broker must advise to the extent necessary to decide what
coverage the purchaser is trying to obtain.63
A special relationship may also arise depending on how a
broker holds himself out. For instance, a Georgia court held that
a broker who was receiving compensation for advice and holding
himself out as a specialist in ensuring adequate coverage was
bound by a duty to advise. 64 Other courts have admitted parol
evidence to show that a special relationship arose by implication.
For instance, a New Jersey court held that where the insured
asked for the “best available” coverage, that the insurance broker
had a heightened duty to ensure that this was met. 65 The court
based its holding on a reliance rationale—because the insured
gave the broker discretion to obtain the best available coverage,
there was a heightened duty to exercise this discretion in a way
that obtained that end. 66
Relatedly, but conceptually distinct, courts in some
jurisdictions have suggested that brokers might be subjected to a
heighted professional duty of care. 67 In negligence causes of
action, the care exercised by defendants is evaluated against a
hypothetical reasonably prudent person standard. 68 This inquiry,
though, is tied to the circumstances of the conduct in question. 69
In occupations where you must be a specialist the law
accordingly imposes the standard of care normally exercised by
people in the profession. 70 In light of the relatively low barriers to
licensing, imposing professional liability upon brokers may be
Pressey Enters., Inc. v. Barnett-France Ins. Agency, 724 N.W.2d 503,
505 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
62
Pressey Enters., Inc. v. Barnett-France Ins. Agency, 724 N.W.2d 503,
505 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
63
Id.
64
European Bakers, Ltd. v. Holman, 338 S.E.2d 702 (Ga. App. 1985).
65
Sobotur v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 491 A.2d 737 (N.J. App.
1984) (superseded by statute in a respect immaterial to this proposition).
66
Id.
67
See Sakall, supra note 40, at 995 (citing cases).
68
Bell v. Maricopa Med. Ctr., 755 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Ariz. App. 1988).
69
See id.
70
Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
61
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overreaching, although it has been proposed. 71 Even with
heightened educational requirements as may be required under
the proposed change of law in this paper, imposing professional
liability will not induce consumers to bring actions against
negligent producers, as the damages at issue here are relatively
small. 72 Also, insurance producers are categorically different than
other professionals, such as lawyers and doctors, whose
allegiances must be pure in order to adequately serve their
client’s interest. Such professionals are entrusted generally with
property and issues of much higher consequence. Conversely,
producers are market makers, albeit in a specialized field, so,
while no duty to advise is inappropriate, a full professional
standard of care is likewise inappropriate.
All “duties” discussed above could, however, be treated
simply as creatures of contract. An oral contract to obtain an
insurance policy, even if the policy would last for more than one
year, is not barred by the statute of frauds. 73 An oral agreement to
obtain a policy as instructed is likely per se enforceable. 74 But
even if it were not, in the event that the consumer purchaser
changes its position in reasonable reliance on the producer’s
promise to obtain the policy, promissory estoppel would likely
bar any defense on statute of frauds grounds.75
In any event, the duties imposed upon producers are
minimal under the common law and they do not at all conform to
the reasonable expectation that to some extent insurance agents
will take care of people by providing them with policies that are
suitable to their situations. Indeed, many even invited reliance by
consumers to varying degrees. 76

See generally Sakall, supra note 40, at 995.
See, e.g., Leslie Scism, Insurance Fees, Revealed, (March 30, 2012
5:08PM
EDT),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230417710457730593020277033
6.html (noting that on a $1000 brokered automobile insurance policy, the
commission would be roughly $150-200).
73
4-12 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §12.8[I][A] (citing cases).
74
See Saunders, 224 Cal. App. 2d at 909 (suggesting that the duty of a
broker to obtain the policy it promises could be characterized as an oral
contract).
75
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §139.
76
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
71
72
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B. Problem 2: Compensation Arrangements Causing Conflicts of
Interest
This section will now outline the second problem this
paper aims to ameliorate through the non-maleficence rule,
namely, how compensation arrangements between producers and
insurers creates conflicts of interests between producers and
consumers. This is a recognized problem, 77 the solution for which
has been disjointed among the states.
Compensation for insurance brokers can come in four
basic forms: salaries, commissions, bonuses, and fees. Depending
on whether a broker is self-employed or not, the compensation
sources may differ. Typically, a large portion of an insurance
broker’s income comes from commissions. 78 Commissions are
usually calculated as a proportion of the premium amounts paid
by the insured. 79 Compensation may also be based upon volume
of sales, that is, the number of policies sold, 80 or tied to the
profitability of the contract for the insurer. 81 Producers may also
charge broker fees. 82 Commissions are paid by the insurer,
See INSURANCE JOURNAL, N.Y. Attorney General Targets Insurance
Broker
Compensation
Arrangements
(April
23,
2004),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2004/04/23/41434.htm
(discussing in part the “placement service agreements” which encourage
producers to steer consumers to purchase contracts from certain insurers in
order to obtain the more favorable compensation).
78
See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational
Handbook,
2012-13
Edition,
Insurance
Sales
Agents,
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/sales/insurance-sales-agents.htm. (last visited May 5,
2013).
79
See, e.g., ZURICH AMERICAN INS. CO., Agent/Broker Compensation
Schedule
–
Auto
Liability,
http://www.zurichnaproducercompensation.com/AutoLiability.aspx (last visited
May 5, 2013).
80
See Joanne Wojcik, Contingent Commissions back in the spotlight,
BUSINESS
INSURANCE
(July
17,
2011),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/99999999/NEWS050101/399999919;
see, e.g., UNITED HEALTHCARE, Overview of Producer Compensation,
http://www.uhc.com/legal/overview_of_producer_compensation.htm
(last
visited May 5, 2013) (noting that bonuses and “override” payments may be
made “in recognition of a high volume of sales”).
81
See, e.g., ZURICH AMERICAN INS. CO., Agent/Broker Compensation
Schedule
–
Workers’
Compensation,
http://www.zurichnaproducercompensation.com/WorkersCompensation.aspx
(last visited May 5, 2013).
82
See STATE OF NEW YORK INS. DEP’T, Circular Letter No. 22 (Aug. 25,
1998), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/circltr/1998/c198_22.htm
77
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essentially splitting the premium with the producer. 83 In addition,
broker fees are paid by the insured.84
As a basic matter, it stands to reason that since
commissions are paid on the total premium amounts, the
producer will have an incentive to try and push premiums higher
by covering more risks. The more risks covered, the higher the
premiums. 85 In the alternative (depending on the producer’s goto-market strategy and the contractual compensation
arrangements with carriers), the producer might also aim to sell
as many policies as possible. Also, where one insurer pays a
higher commission rate, a broker will have an incentive to steer
consumers to such insurer over another, even if that policy will
cost the consumer purchaser more. 86 In the case of sales targets,
the incentive may be in the opposite direction. If a broker is
employed by a brokerage house that pays bonuses based upon
hitting sales targets, this may create incentives to sell policies that
do not adequately cover risk—whether by risk type, in coverage
amount, or with higher deductibles—in the pursuit of higher sales
figures.
C. Other Regulatory Methods and their Deficiencies
Aside from the common law duties, or lack thereof, there
are also other statutory and regulatory methods of regulating
insurance producers, two of which are licensure and
(noting the existence of additional fees charged by brokers directly to the end
consumer purchaser of the insurance contract).
83
See ZURICH AMERICAN INS. CO., Agent/Broker Compensation Schedule
–
Workers’
Compensation,
Table,
http://www.zurichnaproducercompensation.com/WorkersCompensation.aspx
(last visited May 5, 2013) (showing percentage amounts paid for commissions
on workers’ compensation insurance contracts).
84
See Stephen L. Young, When May Broker-Agents Charge Fees?, at 1,
http://www.ibawest.com/pdf/Articles/WhenMayBrokerAgentsChargeFees.pdf
(suggesting that fees may be charged by brokers, so long as disclosed).
85
See generally, Jessica Bosari, What Really Goes into Determining Your
Insurance
Rates,
FORBES.COM
(Jan.
8,
2013
11:53AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneywisewomen/2013/01/08/what-really-goesinto-determining-your-insurance-rates/ (last visited May 8, 2013) (discussing
risk factors and relationship of them to premiums).
86
Depending on the phase of the underwriting cycle, insurers may pay
higher commissions. For instance, early in the cycle where they are trying to
build out their pool in a specific risk type or geography, they may pay higher
commissions to induce brokers to push their insurance products over a
competitors’. See Conwell, supra note 36, at 2.
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compensation disclosure. While these may eliminate some degree
of the two problems at issue here, they do not suffice for the
reasons outlined below.
1. Licensure
Broker licensing regimes among the states are more or less
uniform. The National Association of Insurance Commissions
(NAIC) began an effort to make licensing uniform in 1999 with
the Producer Licensing Model Act (PLMA). As of 2009, the
federal Government Accountability Office reported 47 states had
adopted this act. 87 The NAIC followed the PLMA with issuing
standards for licensure, which, by 2008, the NAIC boasted had
been adopted in large part by many states. 88 These standards,
among other issues, address things like minimum age, citizenship,
education level, acceptable versions of study and verifications on
such study, test procedures, standards, retesting rules,
background checking procedures, and minimum personal
integrity standards.89 As with other professional licensing
regimes, these circulate around minimum competency and
character standards. 90
While competency standards exist to make sure that the
broker we rely upon is worthy of our trust in the subject matter,
character standards make sure that brokers are not predisposed
to morally untrustworthy acts. The PLMA provides in section 12
the bases upon which a license may be denied, not renewed, or
revoked. 91 The grounds for denial, non-renewal or revocation of a
license ambulate back and forth between fraudulent or dishonest
acts, 92 such as outright fraud or forgery, 93 to criminal or morally
87
UNITED STATES GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Report to
Congressional Requesters, Insurance Reciprocity and Uniformity: NAIC and
State Regulators Have Made Progress in Producer Licensing . . . but
Challenges
Remain
(April
2009),
at
15,
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/288231.pdf.
88
NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, NAIC Licensing Assessment Aggregate
Report
of
Findings
(Feb.
19,
2008),
at
4-5,
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_pltf_plwg_PLC_assessment_a
ggregate_report.pdf.
89
Id. at 11-12.
90
See, e.g., MODEL RULES FOR PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble [4] – [5]
(providing for the general requirements of competency and conformance with
the law in personal affairs for attorneys).
91
PRODUCER LICENSING MODEL ACT OF 2000, § 12.
92
See, e.g., id. §12 (A) (1) (providing that providing “incorrect, misleading,
incomplete, or material untrue information in the license application” is
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reprehensible acts, such as felony convictions or not complying
with any child support obligation to which a licensee is subject. 94
Violation of any insurance law may also constitute a ground for
denial.95
This framework points to actions, which serve as proxies
for competency and moral trustworthiness, which correspond
with predispositions for adequate care and loyalty. In this sense,
by a broadly sweeping sorting mechanism, licensure attempts to
address the same issues that the duties of care and loyalty do.
Licensing standards do a good amount of work to sort the grain
from the chaff, but they do not require a producer to provide
policies suitable to the consumer purchaser. Moreover, they do
not prohibit the sale of a higher priced policy in order to get a
higher commission unless such an act rises to the level of an
unfair trade practice. 96
2. Fee Disclosures
In 1998, insurance regulators in New York became aware
of additional fees being charged, in addition to commissions, by
brokers. In a circular, the regulator noted that the charging of
these fees absent disclosure gave rise to “a perception that brokers
are conflicted in their loyalties.” 97 Moreover, the circular noted
that the charging of these fees may violate section 2110 of the
New York Insurance Law, which prohibits dishonest and
untrustworthy practices by brokers.98
This is a wider issue that has been recognized by the
community of insurance commissioners of many states. In 2006,
the President of the NAIC noted that state commissioners had
continued to examine the potential for conflicts of interests that
arise from undisclosed fees and commissions. 99 In 2004, Eliot
grounds for denial, non-renewal, or revocation of license).
93
Id. § 12 (A) (8), (12).
94
Id. § 12 (A) (2), (6), (13).
95
PRODUCER LICENSING MODEL ACT OF 2000, § 12(A)(2).
96
See id. § 12(A)(7).
97
STATE OF NEW YORK INS. DEP’T, Circular Letter No. 22 (Aug. 25,
1998), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/circltr/1998/c198_22.htm.
98
Id.
99
See Public Remarks of Allessandro Iuseppi, President of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, NAIC Financial Summit, March 21,
2006,
at
transcription
pages
8-9,
available
at
http://www.naic.org/Releases/2006_docs/finical_summitt_Address_NAIC_issu
es-IUPPA.pdf.

Franke Article- Final- 11-20-13.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013

Suitability and Non-maleficence

11/26/2013 2:55 PM

89

Spitzer sued March & McLennan Cos., Aon, and Willis Group—
the three largest brokerage houses in the U.S.—alleging that the
brokers had been steering its clients toward certain insurance
carriers in exchange for additional payments from such
carriers. 100 There were other similar suits against smaller
producers. 101 More recently, the Federation of Risk Management
Associations called upon the European Parliament to pass laws
requiring basic fee disclosures by producers as well. 102
Some fee disclosure rules require only disclosure of fees
additional to commissions paid by insurers. 103 New York’s
Insurance Regulation 194 requires disclosure of not only fees but
also commission amounts, if the consumer requests it after an
initial required disclosure by the broker that he or she “will
receive compensation . . . in whole or in part on the insurance
contract the [producer] sells . . . .” 104 This initial disclosure may be
performed orally or in writing.105 The initial disclosure does not
have to include any factors which affect the amount of
compensation the broker will receive; 106 it must only state that the
consumer can obtain additional information on the “nature,
amount and source” of the compensation upon request. 107 The
consumer may also obtain a list of “alternative quotes presented
to the producer” by the carriers. 108
Disclosure has been deemed a sufficient solution to other
Kathy M. Kristof, Insurance Broker to Settle Charges, LOS ANGELES
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jan/06/business/fi-ulr6;
see INSURANCE JOURNAL, N.Y. Attorney General Targets Insurance Broker
Compensation
Arrangements
(April
23,
2004),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2004/04/23/41434.htm.
101
See Kristof, supra note 100 (noting the suit and $2 million settlement of
suit brought by Spitzer against Universal Life Resources of Del Mar, Cal. and
the action also waged against Universal Life Resources by the California
insurance commissioner).
102
Sarah Veysey, FERMA Urges fee disclosures for all insurance buyers,
BUSINESS
INSURANCE
(March
19,
2013
10:13AM),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20130319/NEWS04/130319819.
103
See, e.g., Cal. Code of Reg., Tit. 10, Ch. 5, Subch. 1, Art. 6.8, §
2189.3(d) (requiring disclosure of fees in accordance with an Appendix A); see
also Cal. Code of Reg., Tit. 10, Ch. 5, Subch. 1, Art. 6.8, Appendix A
(providing that fees are payments made by the policy purchaser to the broker
are in addition to commissions that may be paid by carrier).
104
11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 30.3(a)(3).
105
11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 30.3(a).
106
11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 30.3(a)(3).
107
11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 30.3(b)(1).
108
11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 30.3(b)(2).
100
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problems in financial products regulation, such as the U.S.
securities laws. The securities laws, however, presuppose that,
because the capital markets are presumptively efficient, that all
public information is incorporated into the price of the security. 109
Therefore, the reasoning goes, it is immaterial whether the end
purchaser reads or understands the disclosure, as dutiful equity
analysts, being the soldiers of efficiency that they are, pore over
the disclosure forms and the price shifts according to their
buy/sell recommendations.
Consumer insurance contracts are not traded on an
exchange. Therefore, it is less likely that information is
necessarily incorporated into the price that consumer purchasers
are willing to pay for insurance contracts. Also, the Regulation
194 disclosures are not going to sophisticated analysts, but to the
consumers themselves. It is an open question whether, even if the
purchasers do request the additional disclosure, that they read
and understand them. The disclosure forms produced by
Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of New York, Inc.
(IIABNY), a private trade group,110 allow for the compensation to
be disclosed in a percentage or number. 111 Most people
understand the difference between a proportion and an absolute
number, but would they be willing to do calculations? The tables
IIABNY provides for the comparison of quotes are more
promising. They lay things out plainly enough including, most
importantly, the compensation that the producer will receive. 112
If whether entrusting ourselves to our brokers is
reasonable depends on the cost of verifying the truth and honesty
of their assertions, 113 these disclosures may reduce monitoring
costs. The efficacy of such monitoring depends directly on
whether the information is requested and, if so, whether it is read
and understood. Even if consumers do not make disclosure
See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
See INDEP. INS. AGENTS AND BROKERS OF NEW YORK, About us,
http://www.iiabny.org/AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx (“[IIABNY exists to fulfill
the educational, political, and business interests of our . . . agencies and . . .
employees”).
111
INDEP. INS. AGENTS AND BROKERS OF NEW YORK, Statement of
Compensation, Ownership Interest, and Prohibition Against Rebating,
available
at
http://ny.iiaa.org/Advocacy/Reg194/2_Comp_Ownership_Rebating.pdf.
112
See INDEP. INS. AGENTS AND BROKERS OF NEW YORK, Description of
Alternative
Quotes,
available
at
http://ny.iiaa.org/Advocacy/Reg194/2_AltQuotesPresented_PC.pdf.
113
See FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 52.
109
110
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requests, the fear of requests might deter unscrupulous practices
as well.
The New York Department of Financial Services stated to
the author that they do not have any data on how often
consumers actually request the additional disclosures because
“agents are not required to report this information to [the
department].” 114 To the author’s knowledge, there are no public
sources of such data either. Perhaps Regulation 194 has curbed
unscrupulous practices, but this would depend on how often
additional disclosures are requested, whether consumers read and
understand the information provided, what consumers do with
the information, or whether reputational risk provides a sufficient
deterrent. The SEC recently published a study showing that most
Americans surveyed lacked basic financial literacy, 115 which may
cast doubt on the efficacy of disclosures directly to consumers.
While reputational risk may have some deterrent effect, it is not
clear that it is sufficient. 116 Moreover, the duties imposed or
implied by law or equity have replaced in large part the norms
that bind closely-knit communal societies with the transition to a
modern market-based economy wherein economic incentives lead
to moral hazard. 117 Thus, reputational risk may be insufficient to
deter unscrupulous steering by producers, even if it has some
minor demonstrable deterring effect.

IV. THE SUITABILITY STANDARD
A suitability standard applies to broker-dealers 118 of
E-mail from Patricia Douglas, Ass. Ins. Examiner, Consumer
Assistance Unit of the New York Department of Financial Services, to the
author (May 3, 2013, 2:00PM EDT) (on file with author)
115
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY
AMONG
INVESTORS
(AUG.
2012),
AT
III,
AVAILABLE
AT
HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV/NEWS/STUDIES/2012/917-FINANCIAL-LITERACY-STUDYPART1.PDF.
116
At least as far as the large brokerage houses are concerned, the specter
of a reputational stain may be limited in efficacy where cash flow is king. See
Kenneth J. St. Onge, Aon Will Begin Accepting Contingent Commissions
Again,
Insurance
Journal
(Aug.
2,
2010),
available
at
http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/features/2010/08/02/159998.htm
(noting that, notwithstanding five year prohibition on the same under the
Spitzer settlement, Aon would begin to accept contingent commissions again).
117
See Brescia, supra note 18, at 313.
118
A broker is a person in the business of effecting transactions in
securities on the account of others. 15 U.S.C.A § 78c(a)(4)(A). A dealer is a
person in the business of buying and selling securities on its own account. 15
114
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financial securities under FINRA rules, the securities laws, and
now, pursuant to Dodd-Frank, residential mortgage brokers as
well. This section will introduce the suitability standard as
applied to both, the additional rules added by Dodd-Frank for
mortgage brokers to supplement and will tailor the suitability
standard to that context.
A. Introduction to the Standard as Applied to Broker-Dealers
The suitability standard essentially requires that a brokerdealer know his customer and, given this knowledge, make
recommendations upon some reasonable basis that the product is
suitable specifically to the customer. 119 This standard imposes a
lighter duty than full fiduciary duties, which is generally viewed
as the highest standard under the law. 120 It essentially operates as
a pared down duty of care. Implicit in the notion of finding a
suitable product is a certain amount of diligence. One must study
the terms of the instrument, its volatility, its historical returns
and future outlook in order to determine if it is a good
investment. In addition, the suitability standard requires the
broker-dealer to consider the particular customer’s appetite for
risk and investment goals and compare prospective securities
available for purchase against them.
Where a broker-dealer of securities recommends a security
to an investor, the broker-dealer must conclude, first, that the
investment product in question would be suitable for that
investor. 121 That is, if a product recommended by a broker-dealer
were to turn out a sham product, then the broker-dealer might be
held to have not discharged its obligations under this prong if he
could have discovered the sham with reasonable diligence.
Second, the broker-dealer must look to the particular customer in
question and determine whether the product is suitable to the
consumer specifically based on the individual’s characteristics,
U.S.C.A § 78c(a)(5)(A). They are often referred to together, as rules are often
applicable to both.
119
FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA Manual, Rule 2111(a),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=1339
0&element_id=9859&highlight=2111 (last visited May 6, 2013).
120
SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, FIDUCIARY STANDARD RESOURCE
CENTER, OVERVIEW, AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW.SIFMA.ORG/ISSUES/PRIVATECLIENT/FIDUCIARY-STANDARD/OVERVIEW/.
121
Frank A. Hirsch, Jr., The Evolution of the Suitability Standard in the
Mortgage Industry, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 21, 26 (2008).
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such net worth, finances, investment goals, risk aversion, and tax
status. 122
While Rapp suggested that the FINRA suitability
standard does not prescribe a care standard, 123 this is not entirely
correct. He was correct to state that the standard operates more
as an ex post mechanism for evaluating the reasonableness of a
particular recommendation made by a broker in light of the
investment goals of the purchaser.124 But, just because the
FINRA rule does not state the level of attention to the
purchaser’s interests required does not mean that there is no
standard of care. Indeed, the standard is stated in the rule itself—
reasonableness—a standard that permeates the Anglo-American
common law and which has a definite and clear meaning, even if
it is always tied to the facts and circumstances to which it is
applied. These rules incorporate the common law concept of
reasonableness. 125 Reasonableness in this context means that if a
reasonably prudent stockbroker would not have recommended
the stock in light of its risk profile and the investment goals of the
purchaser, then such recommendation is not reasonable.
The SEC, through Rule 17(a)(3)(17), also requires brokerdealers who deal in securities transactions with individuals to
obtain relevant information in order to make a customer-specific
suitability determination. Aside from personal biographical and
contact information, this rule requires that broker-dealers obtain
account investment objectives (e.g., for retirement), the annual
income of the individual, his or her net worth, and whether he or
she is employed in a brokerage firm. 126 The text of the rule states
that broker-dealers “shall make and keep . . . the following books
and records” of which the above records are included.127 But it
also excuses any non-compliance of a broker-dealer on account of
the “neglect, refusal, or inability” to provide relevant information
by a customer. 128 So long as a broker-dealer makes a good faith
Id.
Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for that Little Old
Lady: A Realistic Role for Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability
Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 189, 192 (1998).
124
See id.
125
Cf. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 358 (2005) (noting in
the context of statutory interpretation that “long-established and familiar
principles” of the common law are presumed to be retained unless statutory
purpose indicates clear contrary purpose).
126
17 C.F.R. § 240.17a3(a)(17).
127
17 C.F.R. § 240.17a3(a) (2013).
128
17 C.F.R. §240.17a3(a)(17)(i)(C) (2008).
122
123
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effort to obtain the required information, they will not run afoul
of the rule. 129 But broker-dealers function as market makers for
whom the regulators tailored a rule, which corresponds to what
the regulators deem to be appropriate given their function.
Administratively, the efficacy of any suitability standard
requires information gathering and record keeping effort
requirements. The good faith excuse, while to an extent
undermining the efficacy of the broker-dealer suitability
standard, reflects what might be called a forearm’s length nature
of the transaction. While not a full arm’s length away such that
no duties at all are required, full fiduciary duties are not imposed
either. The issue lies in the “reasonable basis” requirement of the
suitability standard. In the absence of required record keeping,
there is little evidence to refute any reasonable basis
manufactured ex post.
SRO’s, in this case FINRA, must enforce compliance with
these rules. 130 Non-compliance by an SRO may result in the
SRO’s suspension of authority to regulate its members, the
revocation of its registration with the SEC, and censure or other
limitations on its activities. 131 Similarly, the SEC may also do the
same to any member of the SRO in order to protect the interests
of investors. 132 It follows that the teeth of these enforcement
mechanisms when it comes to the broker-dealers transacting with
purchasers of securities is in the prevention of members from
working in the industry.
However, a private plaintiff may also bring an action
under Rule 10(b)(5), which prohibits misrepresentations and
fraud committed with scienter in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security. 133 The Supreme Court has stated that this
private right is available to purchasers and sellers of the
securities. 134 In order to bring an action under 10(b) for breach of
the suitability requirement, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) that the securities purchased were unsuited to the
See Broker-Dealers: Why They Ask for Personal Information,
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/bdpersinfo.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
130
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2013).; see also
17 C.F.R. § 240.19g2-1(a) (2013).
131
Id., § 19(h)(1) (2013).
132
Id., 19(h)(2) (2013).; see also id. 3(b) (2013). (including in the definition
of “member” any broker-dealer “who agrees to be regulated by [an SRO]”).
133
See 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (2013).
134
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975).
129
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buyer’s needs; (2) that the defendant knew or reasonably believed
the securities were unsuited to the buyer’s needs; (3) that the
defendant recommended or purchased the unsuitable securities
for the buyer anyway; (4) that, with scienter, the defendant made
material misrepresentations (or, owing a duty to the buyer, failed
to disclose material information) relating to the suitability of the
securities; and (5) that the buyer justifiably relied to its detriment
on the defendant’s fraudulent conduct.135
B. Suitability Standard as Applied Mortgage Brokers
The Dodd-Frank Act takes the suitability rule and
modifies it to the context of regulating mortgage brokers and
tailors it with additional rules specific to this context. In addition
to its myriad of other reforms, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010
addresses the activities and qualifications of mortgage brokers,
which it terms “mortgage originators.” 136 First it requires that all
mortgage brokers be duly qualified and registered or licensed as
required under state or federal law and that such brokers have a
unique identifying number which it places on all documents
associated with any transaction they broker. 137 It also imposes
upon depository institutions a duty to ensure that these
requirements are met. 138
But, the Act goes further. It directly imposes upon the
brokers a modified suitability requirement. A broker may not
steer a consumer to undertake any residential mortgage that “the
consumer lacks a reasonable ability to repay” or that has
“predatory characteristics or effects.” 139 These rules apply to
creditors, the ultimate counterparty to the mortgages, as well.140
Regulation Z, promulgated by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau pursuant to its obligation to do so under the
Dodd-Frank Act (but not yet adopted on the date this article
went to print), prescribes “ability to repay” information that

Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir.1993).
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1602 (2013) (amending the Truth in Lending Act to define a mortgage
originator as anyone “takes,” “assists a consumer in obtaining or applying to
obtain,” or “offers or negotiates terms of” a residential mortgage loan).
137
Id. § 1639a-b (adding Section 129B(b)(1)(A)-(B) to the Truth in
Lending Act).
138
Id. (adding Section 129B(b)(2) to the Truth in Lending Act.
139
Id. (adding Section 129B(b)(3)(A) to the Truth in Lending Act).
140
See id. § 1639c.
135
136
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mortgage brokers must collect. 141
1. Additional Rules for Mortgage Brokers
Moreover, a broker may not steer a consumer to a
mortgage that is not a “qualified mortgage” if the consumer
qualifies for a qualified mortgage. A qualified mortgage is a
mortgage that lacks certain characteristics, for instance, negative
amortization, interest-only payment, balloon payments, or terms
that exceed 30 years along with stricter underwriting
requirements. 142 This essentially equates to a prohibition on
selling a consumer on a mortgage, which has characteristics that
are known to be problematic for consumer mortgage borrowers if
a mortgage that lacks these characteristics is available. These
provisions are likely due to the lack of regulation of the terms of
mortgages leading up to the financial crisis. This is a point of
contrast with the consumer insurance contract terms, which are
subject to regulatory approval by state commissioners of
insurance. 143 However, the qualified mortgage rule is still
instructive as it serves as the model for the anti-maleficence rule
proposed here.
Dodd-Frank goes even further. It places a blanket ban
against financial incentives paid to mortgage brokers by any
person at all on account of the terms of the mortgage contract it
brokers. 144 It also totally disallows the receipt of compensation
from both the creditor mortgagee and the consumer mortgagor. 145
Both of these provisions obviously raise a conflict of interests
concern between the mortgage broker and consumer
mortgagor. 146
Having laid out now the suitability requirement as applied
to broker-dealers and mortgage brokers, the study now turns to
the proposed framework for producer regulation.

See generally 12 C.F.R 1026.43(c) (1)-(2) (2013). See Note
See 12 C.F.R. 1026.43(e) (2013). See Note
143
See, e.g., supra note 23 and accompanying text.
144
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1403 (2013) (adding section 129B(c)(1) to the Truth in Lending Act).
145
Id.
146
See BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION, Loan
Originator Compensation Requirements under the Truth in Lending Act, Final
Rule; official interpretations, at 148-49, 301 (Jan. 10, 2013), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201301_cfpb_final-rule_ability-to-repay.pdf.
141
142
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V. SUITABILITY AS ALTERNATIVE TO THE DEFECTS OF
THE COMMON LAW AND LICENSURE REGIMES
Like the Dodd-Frank Act did with mortgage broker
regulation, this paper proposes a suitability rule modified to the
producer regulation context and supplemented by an additional
rule to address the unique regulatory challenges of this context.
As shown above, the common law in general treats producers as
mere salespersons. But, like mortgage brokers and broker-dealers
of securities, producers perform a much larger role in the
consumer insurance markets than the duties the common law
imposes upon them would suggest. As of 2004, at least 32% of the
personal lines market was intermediated by some type of
producer. 147 As of 2009, when you combine personal lines with
property and casualty insurance, almost 50% of the market is
brokered by independent agents or brokers. 148 If the producer has
no duty to advise them, then how do they know if they are getting
the appropriate coverage for their risks?
A suitability standard, tailored to the facts of the
insurance industry, should be applied to producers in order to
ameliorate any under- or over-coverage that may result from
either a lack of care or steering to unsuitable contracts by
producers. As I will show below, together with the nonmaleficence standard, a suitability standard would curb
producers’ incentives to offer products unsuitable to their
customers. Moreover, legislatures and regulators should consider
imposing the compliance onus on the insurers to make sure their
producers adhere to these requirements. This will help to
discourage the wastefulness of fighting for access to deeper
pockets by imputation of producer acts to the insurer that has
plagued the common law on this subject. 149 Beyond this, it would
See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 26 at 363 (noting that 32% of total
personal lines insurance market intermediated by independent agents or
brokers and that some is also brokered by exclusive agents). As of 2009, it
appears that number was roughly the same. Madelyn Flannagan & Peter van
Aartrijk, 2009 Property-Casualty Insurance Market: Opportunities &
Competitive Challenges for Independent Agents and Brokers, 5 INDEPENDENT
INSURANCE
AGENTS
AND
BROKERS
OF
AMERICA,
at
http://www.independentagent.com/Resources/Research/SiteAssets/MarketShar
eReport/IIABA-Marketshare-Report-2010.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2013) (see
table entitled “2009 Personal lines”).
148
See Flannagan & van Aartrijk, supra note 147, at 5 (48.8%).
149
For discussions of imputation of producer acts to insurers, see supra
notes 51-52.
147
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give attorneys general a clear, centralized strategy for rooting out
producer carelessness and conflicted actions.
The provisions of Dodd-Frank related to mortgage
brokers are instructive, because the relationship between a
mortgage broker and a consumer borrower is similar to the
relationship between a producer and consumer purchaser. Both
are the face that the end consumer sees and interacts with. Before
the financial crisis, mortgage brokers were primarily paid on two
bases, through direct fees paid by the borrower 150 and through
contingent payments from the ultimate creditor based on the
interest rate increases from a baseline, which increase with the
yield spread premium (and so the profitability of the loan to the
creditor). 151 These compensation sources, in essence, directly
correspond to the broker fees and the contingent payment sources
of income discussed above in connection with producer
compensation. 152
Moreover, there are huge information asymmetries
between producers and consumer purchasers of insurance, just
like between mortgage brokers and consumer mortgagors. 153
Depending on the type of insurance, consumers may only
purchase the coverage in question a few times in their lives. As
noted above, a New Jersey court once held that a producer who
was asked to obtain the “best available” coverage was under a
duty to do just that based upon a reliance rationale and the
reposing of discretion in the producer. 154 While not requiring a
producer to obtain the “best available” policies, the suitability
standard proposed here is based on the same rationale, as to a
certain extent consumers always repose discretion in their
producers.
Additionally, consumer insurance policies are not
available for review pre-purchase. 155 Even if they were, however,
there is scant likelihood that the average consumer would know
Herbert J. Cohen, How are Mortgage Brokers Paid?, at
http://www.realtor.com/home-finance/homebuyer-information/how-aremortgage-brokers-paid.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
151
See Id.
152
See supra, notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
153
James Lacko & Janis Pappalardo, Improving Consumer Mortgage
Disclosures: An Empirical Assessment of Current and Prototype Disclosure
Forms, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ES-12 (June 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/P025505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf.
154
See Sobotur, 491 A.2d at 737.
155
Schwarcz, supra note 17, at 1318-25.
150
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what they say. 156 While the average producer might also have
doubts as to what they say, they are in a better position to find
out and, therefore, the onus should be upon the producer. 157 This
is exactly the scenario wherein it is reasonable for a person to rely
on the person selling the consumer a policy. An untrained person,
who has spent his time and efforts developing alternative skills to
offer the world, cannot be expected to understand everything he
needs to know in order to get the coverage he needs. 158
A. Producer Suitability Recommendations
The first step of a producer suitability standard would be
relatively easy. Assuming that the producer delivers accurate
data to the insurer, the quotes and contracts provided to the
producer should satisfy the first step of a suitability standard,
namely, that the policies offered be suitable to some consumers.
But producers should also have a duty to know their customer, at
least as to elements relevant to obtaining the appropriate
coverage consistent with the consumer purchaser’s appetite for
self-insuring, co-insurance, and deductible levels. For instance,
state regulators could require that producers gather information
such as, in the case of property insurance, an official appraisal on
the value of the property they wish to insure and the extent to
which the policy purchaser wants that value covered, which
would include a discussion of the relationship between the scope
of coverage and/or higher premiums. The same could go for a
discussion of co-insurance and deductible levels. These types of
discussions would be akin to a discussion of investment
objectives and appetite for risk as a securities broker might have
with his client. They could impose a duty to ensure compliance
upon insurers, to lessen the regulatory burden and place on the
entities that can most easily bear it.
In general, producers now only ask questions related to
the risks covered. For instance, for home insurance, they may ask
the customer if there is a swimming pool, whether the house’s
exterior is flammable (e.g., wood) or inflammable (e.g., stone), and
the address of the home and its appraised value. Some of the
Id. at 1325.
Cf. Symposium, The Future of Law and Economics: The NegligenceOpportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 942-43
(1992) (discussing the least cost avoider rationale in tort and contract theory).
158
See FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 49 (noting the importance of relying on
others for efficiency reasons).
156
157
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better producers may ask for information related to the
motivation for getting insurance.
Under the proposed suitability standard, the producer
should also be required to discuss the consumer purchaser’s
appetite for bearing risk of losses through self-insurance, or
increasing deductibles or co-insurance levels. Based on this
information, then, the producer should go and obtain policy
quotes that match the consumer’s level of risk aversion. They
should also advise the consumer specifically what types of
exposure they would be subject to under each policy.
The producer should also be required to obtain the
appraised value and only insure up to that value. Insurers are
bound only to pay for the replacement value of property, subject
to the policy limits, by the principle of indemnity. 159 Therefore,
even if the market value of a house in a neighborhood where
housing prices are rising suggest a higher resell value, the
appraised value would be the better marker of value that the
producer should use so as not to extract premiums higher than
what the insurer would ever have to pay out in an attempt to
increase premiums.
Courts have gone so far as to say that to impose any duty
to advise upon brokers would be too onerous for them, as they
generally lack the necessary education and knowledge to advise
purchasers properly. 160 Not imposing these duties makes sense in
light of the relatively low educational requirements for becoming
a licensed broker in most states. 161 I believe this view is
unacceptable. The fact that the only actor who transacts directly
with the producer justifies a basic advising duty. Like a brokerdealer or a mortgage broker, producers do much more than take
orders and fill them. They hold themselves out as people the
See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A
GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES AND
COMMERCIAL PRACTICES, PRACTITIONER’S EDITION §3.1(a), 135 (1988).
160
Rushing v. Frazier 477 So.2d 1317, 1319-20 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
161
For instance, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) reported in 2008 that at least 35 states had adopted the recommended
standard that no high school diploma is required. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMMISSIONERS, NAIC Producer Licensing Aggregate Report of Findings,
Feb.
19,
2008,
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_pltf_plwg_PLC_assessment_a
ggregate_report.pdf. The motivation for recommending such a low education
level is not elucidated in the report. This paper suggests that educational
requirements should be raised, at least to the extent necessary to give effect to
the suitability standard and non-maleficence rule proposed here.
159
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consumer public needs and as people who will hold themselves to
a basic level of care.
The suitability requirement, however, does not adequately
address the potential for conflicts of interest that arise out of the
compensation arrangements between insurers and producers. 162
Indeed, for this reason, Dodd-Frank required the SEC to produce
a study to evaluate whether a higher standard should be applied
to broker-dealers. 163 In the study, the SEC recommended that a
higher fiduciary standard should be imposed upon brokerdealers. 164 This was met with extreme approbation from the
industry.165 In the same way that broker-dealers “are not just
order takers,” 166 producers are not just order takers, as consumers
inevitably rely on them to some extent and have no way to
evaluate their veracity. Nor do consumer purchasers of insurance
get the opportunity to review the policy beforehand.167
Where fee disclosure requirements attempt to do this, they
either fail to provide the necessary information regarding the
compensation from insurers to producers. Even if they provide
sufficient information, the disclosures are made to consumers
who may lack the appropriate sophistication to evaluate them. It
would be better to just impose a rule that prevents the harm that
concerns us, which this paper’s non-maleficence rule aims to do.

162
See Tim Sobelewski, Fiduciary vs. Suitability – Which Standard is
Best?,
FINANCIAL
PLANNING
ASS’N
at
http://www.fpanet.org/ToolsResources/ArticlesBooksChecklists/Articles/Finan
cialPlanning/FiduciaryvsSuitabilityWhichstandardisbest/ (last visited Sept. 27,
2013) (“[The suitability standard] does not demand that your broker do what is
best for you—only that it is “suitable.”) (emphasis in original).
163
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78o, 80b-11 (2013).
164
See SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N, Study on Investment
Advisers and Broker-Dealers, January 2011, at ii, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
165
See Elizabeth MacBride, Fiduciary Standard Soon May Regulate
Broker-Dealer Deals, CNBC.COM, (April 29, 2013, 12:00AM EDT),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100662116 (quoting former SEC chairman Arthur
Levitt who commented that the imposition of the new standard “is extremely
important, otherwise the industry wouldn’t be fighting it”).
166
Id. (quoting Arthur Levitt).
167
See Schwarcz, supra note 17 at 1318-25 (discussing the lack of
transparency and unavailability of consumer insurance contracts for review
pre-purchase).
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B. Producer Non-Maleficence Rule
Similar to mortgage broker regulations, where Congress
found that a suitability standard alone was not sufficient, so too
does this paper propose a non-maleficence rule to address a
challenge unique to insurance producer regulation. To further
curb any incentive on account of the compensation arrangements
between insurers and producers, additional legislative-teeth are
needed. Instead of an all-out ban on incentive arrangements like
in Dodd-Frank, which may be needed at times for legitimate
reasons such as filling out the pool of risks in a given market, 168
the non-maleficence rule would state:
[W]here there are two policies which are equally
suitable to the particular consumer but with different
compensation outcomes for the producer, the producer
may not choose to sell the policy which leads to a better
compensation outcome for him, unless that policy is
equal or less in price than the policy which would lead
to the worse compensation outcome for him.
In this way, the producer would practice non-maleficence,
in that he would not harm the consumer by choosing the policy
that leads to a better outcome for him.
Maleficence would be measured in the price paid. The
benefit of this rule would be in its ease of administration. Bright
line rules are administratively convenient and, therefore,
efficient. 169 While bright line rules can create a “blueprint for
fraud” 170 or other surreptitious non-compliance, this nonmaleficence rule does not exist in a vacuum. Indeed the first
prong of this proposed reform is a standard-based care
requirement. Only after the collection of all possible insurance
contracts is delimited to those suitable substantively to the
particular customer before the producer, then the inquiry
abandons any further substantive inquiry for a pure comparison
in terms of premium prices. The producer may not simply sell a
lower priced contract if he reasonably cannot argue that it
substantively meets the needs of the consumer.
See infra note 172-83 and accompanying text.
See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista 532 U.S. 318, 3547 (2001) (Justice
Souter commenting that bright line rules lead to administrative convenience).
170
Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting
Out of Securities Regulation by Private Agreement 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
519, 562 (1999).
168
169
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This simple approach is appropriate. Imposing upon
producers any higher duty would, firstly, be unnecessary in light
of the relatively small risks that are covered through consumer
insurance contracts. 171 Second, a higher duty may impose too high
a cost on the producer in terms of worry and administrative effort
than is justified by the compensation received. 172 Lastly, a
blanket proscription of financial incentives may actually impede
the underwriting cycle, a key peculiarity of the insurance
business, and may also impede competitiveness of the insurance
markets.
This last point bears additional consideration. Depending
on where an insurer is in its underwriting cycle, which is the
period of time during which an insurer’s profits go from a high
point to a low point and then back again, 173 an insurer may pay
higher commissions in the first high point, when they are trying
to attract more business, and lower rates during the time when
they are trying to reestablish profitability.174 The underwriting
cycle is a creature peculiar to the insurance industry.175 It is a
product of the supply of insurance contracts in a given market,
which arises as a result of insurers flooding a market with
contracts in an effort to capitalize on a profit opportunity.176
Profit opportunities are often driven by a rise in interest
rates, which increases returns on investments insurers make in
the capital markets. 177 The glut of supply drives premium rates
down, 178 which increases actuarial insolvency risk. When a rash
of losses occur then, the premiums charged then do not cover the
losses and then insurers are either forced out of business, tap into
reserves (which decreases return on equity) or have to be propped
up by affiliates. 179 Following this, the insurers who survive the
downward sloping profit period are able to charge higher
premiums and restore profitability. 180
As an initial matter, we might ask why we tolerate the
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See Scism, supra note 72.
173
David J. Nye, et al., The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Cycle: An
Analysis of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO. L.J. 1495,
1525 (1988).
174
Conwell, supra note 36 at 2.
175
Nye, et al., supra note 172, at 1525.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 1526.
178
Id.
179
See generally, id.
180
Id.
171
172
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underwriting cycle. Basically, it is a product of the business
model. Where premiums equal expected losses from an insured
pool, 181 which they aim to do, 182 insurance companies make no
profit off of premiums. Therefore, profit must come from
somewhere, which is through investment in the capital
markets. 183 To induce market participants to enter the market,
there must be some profit incentive and, since this incentive in
this context arises from returns on investments, we tolerate this
because the insurance markets are essential to the operation of
society. 184
Allowing
competitive
commission
arrangements,
combined with adequate solvency oversight by state insurance
regulators, can encourage efficiency in the consumer insurance
markets and ensure that large conglomerates are not extracting
rents from the market. 185 The tension between the commission
arrangements and the non-maleficence rule will allow for
competition while also protecting the consumer from conflicted
steering by producers. Because the terms of insurance contracts
are reviewed and approved by regulators,186 the predatory terms
concern present in the residential mortgage markets is
inapplicable to the consumer insurance market. Therefore, the
non-maleficence rule only requires that, among suitable contracts,
the producer may not choose one that results in a better
compensation outcome for him if that contract will cost the
customer more.
Enforcement of this producer suitability and nonmaleficence rule should allow for a private right of action along
See John A. Fibiger & Stephen G. Kellison, 23 TRANSACTIONS OF
SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES 1, 1-3 (1971).
182
See id.
183
See Insurance Asset Management: Internal, External, or Both?,
NATIONAL
ASS’N
OF
INS.
COMM’N,
ET
AL.
at
http://www.naic.org/capital_markets_archive/110826.htm (last visited Sept.
27, 2013) (“Insurance companies, by their very nature, accumulate substantial
amounts of cash that are used to purchase invested assets.”).
184
See Eberhaud Faust, The Fundamental Role of Insurance: Enabling
Economic Growth and Social Development, MUNICH RE, at 4,
http://www.genevaassociation.org/Portals/0/COP15_Munich_Re_presentation.
pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
185
I define rent-seeking here as the act by one party to a contract
increasing its wealth without any correlative value creation for its
counterparty. That is, it is the extracting of wealth from an already established
and static reservoir of value. See Ward Farnsworth, THE LEGAL ANALYST 66
(2007).
186
See, e.g., supra note 21.
181
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the lines allowed under the broker-dealer suitability standard.
However, due to the relatively low damages, 187 there may be little
incentive for private actors to bring suits. Therefore, imposing a
duty upon insurers to make sure that any producer who brokers
its insurance contracts, much like what is proposed under DoddFrank with respect to the ultimate mortgage creditor whose
residential loans are brokered by mortgage brokers. Insurance
commissions could periodically review compliance and
recommend to attorneys general where investigations are
appropriate in addition to unfair trade practices actions.

VI. CONCLUSION
In his characteristically adenoidal tone, Woody Allen
might be tempted to amend his statement: “There are worse
things than death, have you ever spent an evening reading about
insurance producer regulation?” The regulation of insurance
producers, while perhaps not demanding of popular attention, 188
is a perennial issue for insurance professionals—forever on the
minds of scholars, practitioners, regulators and industry
participants. While strides have been made in recent years to
lessen the conflicts of interest created by the compensation
arrangements through disclosure regimes, the efficacy of these is
questionable. Similarly, the common law and licensure regimes
are wholly inadequate in protecting the consumer purchasers of
insurance reasonable reliance upon producers.
While more study should be completed on what factors
producers should consider when determining whether a policy is
suitable, the consumer purchaser’s appetite for bearing risk, the
replacement value of the property and the motivation for buying
insurance should be considered. After searching for suitable
policies, the producer should be bound by a non-maleficence rule,
where he must give the consumer the best priced option, no
matter the compensation outcome for the producer. In the event
that there are two suitable options with equal price but differing
compensation outcomes, the producer may choose the one with
the better compensation outcome in order to ensure that insurers
See Scism, supra note 72.
But see Leslie Alderman, Getting a Guide for the Jungle of Individual
Health Policies, NEW YORK TIMES, at B5 (Sept. 11, 2010) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/11/health/11patient.html?_r=0 (discussing in
part the advisability of calling state insurance regulators to determine if any
complaints have been filed against a broker before using them).
187
188
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can ride their underwriting cycle through offering higher
commissions where required to build market share, which will
have the effect of increasing competitiveness in the market for
consumer insurance.

